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Best Brief* 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-DAVIS SCHOOL OF LAW 
GABRIELLE JANSSENS , MICHAEL MINKLER, AND MONICA BAUMANN 
 
________________________________________________________ 
Civ. App. No. 08-1001  
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TWELFTH 
CIRCUIT 
__________________________________________________________________ 
GALLEON ENTERPRISES INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPWRECKED VESSEL, if any, its apparel, 
appurtenances, and cargo located within a five-mile radius of the GOLD COAST 
NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY, coordinates provided to the Court under 
seal, 
Defendant in rem, 
and 
THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, 
Claimant-Appellee, 
and 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Intervenor-Appellee. 
________________________________________________________
Brief for The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Intervenor-Appellee 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
     * This brief has been reprinted in its original format.  Please note that the Table of 
Authorities and the Table of Contents for this brief have been omitted.  
1
BB_U.S._26.2 7/27/2009  6:20 PM 
656 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  26 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
It is the position of the United States of America that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over all claims presented in this appeal.  Galleon, 
Inc., properly initiated this action in rem for title or salvage rights to the 
Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel under the federal court’s admiralty 
jurisdiction.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  The United States intervened to 
make claims against Galleon under four federal statutes: the National 
Marine Sanctuary Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445(a) (2006); the Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1599 (2006); the River and Harbors Act, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-430 (2006); and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251–1387 (2006).  Federal courts have jurisdiction over all cases arising 
from federal statutes.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the SMCA applies to the sunken vessel referred to as La 
Contesta.   
II. Whether the sunken vessel is subject to sovereign immunity and 
whether Spain’s consent is necessary for salvage.   
III. Whether a research/recovery permit authorized under NMSA is 
required for salvage of the sunken vessel and extends to the cargo 
outside of the GCNMS.   
IV. Whether NOAA acted permissibly under the APA in denying 
Galleon’s research/recovery permit for salvage within the GCNMS.  
V. Whether the Secretary of Commerce acted permissibly under the 
APA in denying Galleon an ESA incidental take permit to drill 
through endangered deep sea coral.   
VI. Whether COE and NPDES permits are required for Galleon’s 
salvage activities. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Galleon Enterprises, Inc. (“Galleon”) brought the original suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Union to gain title to, or 
in the alternative, a salvage award for, salvage activities conducted on an 
unidentified shipwreck off the coast of New Union.  (R. at 3.)  The 
Kingdom of Spain (“Spain”) intervened, alleging that the shipwreck is the 
remains of a Spanish frigate called Nuestra Señora La Contesta de Aragon 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/16
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(“La Contesta”).  (R. at 4.)  Spain claims La Contesta is a warship listed on 
its official navy register and is the inalienable property of Spain.  Id. 
The United States also intervened with claims that Galleon violated the 
National Marine Sanctuary Act (“NMSA”), the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), the River and Harbors Act (“RHA”), and the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”).  (R. at 4.)  The U.S. claims that because the wreck lies within the 
Gulf Coast National Marine Sanctuary (“GCNMS”), Galleon was required 
to obtain permits from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”) for research/recovery.  Id.  In addition, Galleon 
was required to obtain a permit from the Secretary of Commerce 
(“Secretary”) for incidental take of deep sea coral.  Id.  It was also required 
to obtain permits from the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (“COE”) and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for the construction of a 
drilling platform and discharge of a pollutant from a point source within 
navigable waters. 
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Union.  Galleon appeals the District Court’s ruling on 
the laws of find and salvage within the GCNMS boundaries.  Galleon also 
appeals the COE and EPA permits, the Secretary’s denial of an ESA take 
permit, and NOAA’s authority under NMSA, or in the alternative the denial 
of a research/recovery permit.  (R. at 1.)  Spain appeals the District Court’s 
ruling on the Sunken Military Craft Act (“SMCA”) and the law of salvage 
regarding the artifacts in the wreck.  (R. at 1-2.)  The United States appeals 
the District Court’s ruling regarding NOAA’s authority to require a permit 
for the artifacts found outside the GCNMS and with the court’s application 
of the SMCA.  (R. at 2.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In April 2008, Galleon discovered several artifacts 600 feet underwater 
and 24 nautical miles from the coast of New Union.  (R. at 1, 5.)  The 
artifacts lie partially within the boundaries of the GCNMS.  Id.  Spain 
asserts that the shipwreck is La Contesta, a frigate that sailed as part of a 
fleet of military ships belonging to the Royal Spanish Navy.  The historical 
record shows that the frigate escorted a fleet of twenty Spanish merchant 
galleons on their way to Peru.  (R. at 5.)  On the return journey, La Contesta 
was carrying mail, private passengers, and a consignment of merchant 
goods.  Id.  As the returning ships passed by the coast of present day New 
Union, a hurricane hit the fleet.  Id.  Almost half of the ships, including La 
Contesta, perished in this storm.  Id. 
3
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The historical record shows that the current day resting site of La 
Contesta is within the GCNMS.  (R. at 5.)  The Secretary created the 
GCNMS pursuant to the NMSA.  The NMSA authorizes the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to develop a management plan for submerged 
lands and resources and to designate such locations as national marine 
sanctuaries.  Id.  GCNMS includes marine waters surrounding the coast of 
New Union out to twenty-four nautical miles from shore.  Id.  The 
sanctuary was specifically created to protect natural and historical 
resources.  Id. 
After discovering the location of the shipwreck, Galleon applied for a 
permit from NOAA to excavate the vessel and its cargo.  (R. at 6.)  NOAA 
denied the research/recovery permit.  Id.  NOAA concluded from the 
information it received from Galleon that the artifacts Galleon discovered 
were the remains of La Contesta and that Galleon needed permission from 
Spain to conduct salvage activities.  Id.  Spain refused Galleon’s request to 
salvage.  Id. 
Galleon began salvage operations despite the permit denial.  (R. at 6.)  
In the process, it built a drilling platform without a permit from COE and 
discharged pollutants through the mailbox technique without a CWA 
permit. Id.  During the salvage operations, Galleon harmed or destroyed 
Johnson seagrass and deep sea coral, which are threatened and endangered 
species under the ESA, respectively.  (R. at 13.)  On June 25, 2008, the 
District Court issued a warrant for the arrest of the sunken frigate and its 
cargo.  (R. at 6.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The SMCA applies to the shipwreck in question, thus the law of finds 
and salvage is not applicable.  The shipwreck is also subject to sovereign 
immunity.  A research/recovery permit is required for the entire shipwreck, 
both within and outside of the GCNMS, and NOAA acted reasonably in 
denying Galleon’s request for a research/recovery permit within the 
GCNMS.  ESA, RHA, and CWA permits were all mandatory for Galleon’s 
salvage activities, and NOAA acted permissibly in denying Galleon an ESA 
incidental take permit.  
1. Sunken Military Craft Act: The SMCA applies in this case because the 
Spanish vessel La Contesta sank in modern day U.S. waters while on 
military noncommercial service for Spain.  Under the SMCA, the 
shipwreck should not be disturbed without the appropriate permit.  
Sunken Military Craft Act, Pub. L. No. 108-375, title XIV, § 1402, 118 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/16
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Stat. 1811.  The lower court erred in holding that La Contesta was a 
commercial vessel at the time it sank.  Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 609 (1992).  La Contesta falls under the 
definition of a “warship,” therefore, the SMCA applies.  United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea art. 29, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397.  
2. Sovereign Immunity: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(“FSIA”), this shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity.  28 U.S.C. § 
1604 (2006).  Based on the evidence, Spain has met the burden of 
establishing ownership over the shipwreck in question.  California v. 
Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491, 500 (1998).  Under salvage law, it is 
the right of the owner of the vessel to refuse salvage services; therefore 
Galleon cannot proceed without the consent of Spain.  Sea Hunt v. 
Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000).  
3. National Marine Sanctuary Act: A research and recovery permit is 
required prior to conducting salvage activities on a sunken shipwreck in 
the GCNMS.  15 C.F.R. § 922.166(c) (2007).  NOAA has regulatory 
authority over the resources of the GCNMS.  The Property Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution grants NOAA the authority to protect the resources of 
the GCNMS.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  This authority extends to 
the entire shipwreck and its cargo, within and outside of the GCNMS, 
because these resources are threatened by Galleon’s activity.  United 
States. v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979).  In addition, NOAA 
acted reasonably in interpreting the NMSA to require permission from a 
foreign sovereign for salvage of a shipwreck subject to sovereign 
immunity.  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32-33 (1981).  Finally, NOAA’s decision to deny 
the research/recovery permit was reasonable based on Galleon’s failure 
to obtain the consent of Spain.  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  
4. Endangered Species Act: The denial of the ESA permit was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law under the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”).  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).  This Court should 
give full deference to denial of the permit because the Secretary may 
deny an incidental take permit based on the harm to the species.  50 
C.F.R. § 17.22 (2007).  The Secretary may deny the permit if she finds 
that the take is not incidental.  50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(A) (2007).  
Additionally, the Secretary may deny the permit if she finds the harm to 
the species will reduce its likelihood to survive and recover in the wild.  
5
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50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(D) (2007).  In this case the take was not 
incidental, and the species’ ability to survive in the wild would be 
reduced, therefore the Secretary acted reasonably in denying the permit.  
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 175, 184 & n. 29 (1978).  
5. The Rivers and Harbors Act: Under the RHA, COE permit is necessary 
for construction of any structure within the rivers, the harbors, or the 
contiguous zone of the United States.  33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).  Congress 
clearly intended the COE to have broad regulatory authority over all 
types of structures on the outer continental shelf, regardless of the 
purpose or the type of the structure.  Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 398 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2005).  
Galleon failed to obtain an RHA permit before constructing a drilling 
platform within the contiguous zone of the U.S.  (R. at 11.)  The District 
Court ruling that an RHA permit was required should be affirmed and an 
injunction should issue ordering Galleon to remove the structure. 
 
6. The Clean Water Act: A National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (“NPDES”) permit is required for the discharge of any pollutant 
from a point source to the waters of the United States.  33 U.S.C. § 
1342(a) (2006).  The definition of “discharge” includes “addition” of a 
pollutant.  40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a) (2007).  The word “addition” “may 
reasonably be understood to include ‘redeposit.’”  Avoyelles Sportsmen’s 
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923 (4th Cir. 1983).  As the lower 
court held, the mailbox technique employed by Galleon redeposits 
pollutants on the sea floor and is therefore a the discharge of a pollutant 
into the waters of the United States without an NPDES permit.  Galleon 
should be enjoined from continuing this activity. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUNKEN MILITARY CRAFT ACT APPLIES TO THE 
WRECK REFERRED TO AS LA CONTESTA BECAUSE IT IS A 
MILITARY VESSEL 
The District Court erred in holding that the wreck referred to as La 
Contesta is not a military vessel, and thus not subject to the SMCA.  The 
SMCA applies to the military vessels of both the United States and foreign 
sovereigns.  The facts in the record indicate that La Contesta is a military 
vessel and thus this Court should find that the SMCA applies to the sunken 
frigate in question.  Therefore, the laws of find and salvage do not apply. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/16
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The SMCA prohibits any activity that disturbs, removes, injures, or 
attempts to disturb, remove, or injure any sunken military vessel.  Pub. L. 
No. 108-375, title XIV, § 1402, 118 Stat 1811.  Such activities may be 
authorized by issuance of a permit under the SMCA.  Id.  In its attempted 
salvage activities, Galleon disturbed, removed, or injured La Contesta 
without a permit in violation of the SMCA.  (R. at 6.) 
The SMCA defines the term “sunken military craft” as “any sunken 
warship, naval auxiliary, or other vessel that was owned or operated by a 
government on military noncommercial service when it sank.”  Pub. L. No. 
108-375, § S1408(3)(A).  To determine whether La Contesta is a sunken 
military vessel, the court must (1) determine whether it is a warship and (2) 
whether it was on noncommercial service when it sank.  The SMCA does 
not provide definitions for all of the terms used.  It does, however, state in 
section 1406(b) that the SMCA “shall be applied in accordance with 
generally recognized principles of international law and in accordance with 
the treaties, conventions, and other agreements to which the United States is 
a party.”  Accordingly, since the SMCA does not provide definitions for 
warship or commercial service, it is appropriate to turn to consistent 
authority in other statutes and treaties.  Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
The definition of “warship” in the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea supports the finding that La Contesta is a military vessel.  
The Convention defines a “warship” as: 
[A] ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external 
marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an 
officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name 
appears in the appropriate service list . . . and manned by a crew which is 
under regular armed forces discipline. 
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea art. 29, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.  La Contesta was under the command of the Spanish 
government and was listed in the registry of the Royal Spanish Navy when 
it sank.  (R. at 4.)  Spain also believes La Contesta is the gravesite of 
military men, meaning the frigate was manned by a crew under armed 
forces discipline.  Id.  Under this definition, La Contesta is a warship. 
This Court should turn to the FSIA as persuasive authority because the 
SMCA does not provide a definition for commercial activity.  See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2006).  The FSIA defines commercial activity as 
“either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial 
transaction or act.”  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006).  This determination is 
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made through “reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court found that when determining whether an activity is 
commercial, “the issue is whether the government’s particular actions . . . 
are the type of actions by which a private party engages in commerce.”  
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607 (emphasis in original). 
Applying this definition to the facts here, this Court should find that La 
Contesta was not engaged in the “types” of actions which a private person 
would do in commerce.  Under common understanding and natural 
language, commercial ships do not carry military personnel or weapons.  La 
Contesta began its journey by serving as a military escort to a commercial 
ship.  (R. at 5.)  Spain asserts that there were military personnel on the 
return voyage.  (R. at 4.)  Furthermore, La Contesta is listed on the Royal 
Spanish Navy registry, indicating it was a military vessel.  Id. 
Even though La Contesta carried private persons and cargo, it was still 
on its military mission when it embarked on its return voyage to Spain.  The 
Supreme Court in Weltover emphasized it was the “nature,” not the 
“purpose” that mattered in determining whether an activity is commercial.  
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607.  The nature of La Contesta’s voyage was 
military.  La Contesta was a frigate on assignment to protect a commercial 
fleet.  (R. at 5.)  The purpose of its trip from Peru to Spain was to return 
home and transport mail, private persons, and personal cargo.  Id.  The 
nature of La Contesta’s return voyage was therefore still inherently 
military. 
Under the FSIA definition, La Contesta was not engaged in a 
commercial activity when it sank.  It is thus a sunken military craft and falls 
under the SMCA.  This Court should find that the nature of its trip was 
military because La Contesta was a frigate on the homeward bound leg of a 
military journey.  Since the SMCA applies, the law of finds and the law of 
salvage are not applicable to La Contesta.  Pub. L. No. 108-375, §§ 
1406(c)-(d). 
When ruling on the SMCA issue, this court should consider the 
impacts to the United States’ international policy implication.  It is 
important to respect amicable diplomatic relations between sovereign 
nations.  In 2004, the President issued a public notice stating the policy of 
the United States on sunken government vessels of both the United States 
and foreign nations.  Protection of Sunken Warships, Military Aircraft and 
Other Sunken Government Property, 69 Fed. Reg. 5,647 (Feb. 5, 2004).  
“The United States will use its authority to protect and preserve sunken 
craft of the United States and other nations.”  Id.  In this public notice, 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/16
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Spain stated it did not abandon or relinquish ownership over sunken 
military vessels or their contents.  Id.  Spain also “present[ed] its 
compliments” to the Department of State for honoring Spanish laws and 
policy regarding the remains of their sunken ships.  Id.  It is in the United 
States’ interest to maintain this amicable relationship with Spain to ensure 
the United States receives reciprocal treatment of its sunken vessels in 
foreign waters. 
This court should apply the SMCA to La Contesta.  Under the 
definitions of commercial and warship, La Contesta is a military vessel that 
sank while on a noncommercial voyage.  Since the SMCA applies, La 
Contesta is not subject to the laws of find and salvage. 
II.  SPAIN HAS ESTABLISHED OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUNKEN 
VESSEL, THEREFORE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY APPLIES 
AND SALVAGE ACTIVITIES REQUIRE SPAIN’S CONSENT 
If the shipwreck in question is La Contesta, then the SMCA applies as 
established in the preceding section of this brief.  However, if the court 
finds that the shipwreck is not La Contesta, but instead is a commercial 
Spanish vessel, then the question becomes whether or not Spain is entitled 
to claim sovereign immunity, and if so, whether Galleon must obtain 
Spain’s consent before conducting salvage operations.  Spain has presented 
sufficient evidence to establish that the sunken shipwreck is a Spanish 
vessel.  It is the position of the United States that Spain is entitled to 
sovereign immunity, whether or not this shipwreck is La Contesta, and 
consent is required prior to conducting salvage activities. 
The facts of the present case are similar to the facts of Sea Hunt.  221 
F.3d 634.  In Sea Hunt, a salvage company discovered two sunken Spanish 
military ships off the coast of Virginia.  Id. at 638.  The State of Virginia 
asserted ownership over the ships under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 
which gives states title to shipwrecks abandoned and embedded in the 
submerged lands of the state.  Id.  Spain intervened in Sea Hunt’s in rem 
admiralty action, asserting that the ships were not abandoned and Spain was 
still the owner.  Id.  The Fourth circuit agreed with Spain, finding that Spain 
was the owner of the shipwrecks.  Id. at 646.  The court also held that under 
the law of salvage, it is the right of the owner of any vessel to refuse 
unwanted salvage.  Id. at 648 n. 2.  In Sea Hunt, the court properly held that 
Spain had not abandoned the vessels, that title remained with the sovereign, 
and that consent was required prior to salvage operations. 
The Sea Hunt case pre-dates the SMCA, otherwise it is likely that the 
SMCA would apply in that scenario, as it should apply to the present case.  
9
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Additionally, Spain did not assert a claim of sovereign immunity in Sea 
Hunt.  However, the court relied on express agreements between Spain and 
the United States requiring “that in our territorial waters, Spanish ships are 
to be accorded the same immunity as United States ships.”  Sea Hunt, 221 
F.3d at 643.  This Court should respect this treaty obligation and afford 
Spanish ships broad protection under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Spain contends that because this is a Spanish shipwreck, and they have 
not abandoned it, sovereign immunity applies and Galleon needs Spain’s 
consent before conducting any salvage operations.  The line between cases 
where sovereign immunity applies and cases where it does not is not clear.  
Historically, courts often deferred to the political branches of government 
for expressions of whether or not sovereign immunity should apply.  See 
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).  While the State 
Department generally adopted a restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, 
the process was subject to political pressure instead of the rule of law.  “The 
situation whereby courts would defer to executive determinations of 
sovereign immunity claims frequently led to results which were inconsistent 
with the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.”  Jet Line Serv., Inc. v. 
M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1169 (D. Md. 1978). 
Congress acted to take politics out of the sovereign immunity doctrine 
when it passed the FSIA in 1976.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.  The FSIA 
takes the reliance on the political branches of government out of the 
determination of sovereign immunity by granting a blanket immunity 
subject only to specific exceptions.  28 U.S.C. § 1604.  The specific 
exceptions are enumerated in the act, however none are relevant to the 
present case.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (2006).  Therefore, if Spain is the 
owner of the shipwreck discovered by Galleon, then it is entitled to 
sovereign immunity. 
Spain must also establish that it is the owner of the vessel.  NOAA 
agreed with Spain that this is a Spanish shipwreck when it denied Galleon’s 
research and recovery permit on the grounds that Spain’s consent was 
required before Galleon could continue its salvage operations.  (R. at 6.)  
The Supreme Court has not determined what standard of proof a sovereign 
must meet in order to establish ownership.  However, the Supreme Court 
noted disagreement between several circuit courts.  Deep Sea Research, 523 
U.S. at 500.  The Ninth Circuit adopted a preponderance of the evidence 
test, while two other circuits, the Seventh and the First, have held that a 
sovereign need only make a bare assertion to ownership.  Id. (citing Zych v. 
Wrecked Vessel Believed to be the Lady Elgin, 960 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 
1992)); Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and 
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Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 717 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1983).  Even if this court 
were to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s higher standard of proof, Spain has still 
established ownership of the shipwreck. 
The record shows that all of the historic evidence and all of the 
artifacts that have been recovered support Spain’s claim that this is a 
Spanish shipwreck.  R. at 12.  Furthermore, even the evidence that Galleon 
presented to NOAA “strongly suggests that the only ships that sank within 
the GCNMS within historic times were Spanish vessels that sailed in the 
mid 1730’s from Peru to Spain.”  Id.  Based on this evidence, the United 
States concludes that this is a Spanish shipwreck subject to sovereign 
immunity.  As such, Galleon must have consent from Spain before it can 
proceed with salvage operations.  Spain has established that the unidentified 
shipwreck in this case is a Spanish vessel; that sovereign immunity applies, 
and that Galleon must have Spain’s consent prior to conducting salvage 
operations. 
III.  GALLEON’S ACTIVITIES REQUIRE A RESEARCH /  
RECOVERY PERMIT, AND NOAA ACTED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH LAW BY DENYING THE PERMIT 
Galleon’s method of salvaging the sunken frigate caused harm to the 
historic and archaeological value of the shipwreck and violated GCNMS 
regulations.  A research/recovery permit was therefore necessary for the 
salvage of any portion of the wreck.  In addition, NOAA acted permissibly 
in denying the permit because Galleon needed Spain’s permission to 
salvage the frigate.  This Court should therefore reverse the District Court’s 
ruling that NOAA’s jurisdiction does not extend to the entire wreck.  This 
court should affirm the District Court’s ruling on jurisdiction within the 
GCNMS and NOAA’s decision in denying the permit. 
 
A. Galleon’s excavation methods violated GCNMS regulations and 
therefore required authorization through a permit 
The NMSA authorizes conservation and regulation of marine 
sanctuaries.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445(a).  Congress found that some areas 
of the marine environment posses historical, cultural, archaeological, and 
environmental qualities which “give them special national, and in some 
cases international, significance.” 16 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(1) (2006).  The 
Secretary of Commerce is authorized to issue regulations in order to carry 
out the Act.  16 U.S.C. § 1439 (2006). 
11
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Under the NMSA, a number of activities are prohibited within marine 
sanctuaries.  The Act states that it is unlawful to “destroy, cause the loss of, 
or injure any sanctuary resource.”  16 U.S.C. § 1436(1) (2006).  A 
“sanctuary resource” is any living or nonliving resource that contributes to 
the ecological, historical, educational, cultural, or archeological value of the 
sanctuary.”  16 U.S.C. § 1432(8) (2006).  The Secretary is also authorized 
to promulgate regulations which specify the sanctuary resources for each 
different sanctuary.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1434, 1439 (2006). 
The Secretary established the GCNMS pursuant to the NMSA off the 
coast of New Union.  (R. at 5.)  The GCNMS is governed by the regulations 
and management plan for the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary 
(“FKNMS”).  The purpose of the sanctuary is to protect natural and cultural 
resources such as seagrasses, corals, and shipwrecks.  (R. at 5.)  The sunken 
frigate therefore falls within the definition of a sanctuary resource.  See 16 
U.S.C. § 1432(8). 
The Secretary may issue permits which authorize activities that are 
otherwise prohibited.  16 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).  Specifically, the Secretary 
may issue a Research/Recovery of Sanctuary Historic Resources permit.  15 
C.F.R. § 922.166(c).  Research and recovery permits must meet all of the 
conditions of General Permits, as well as requirements specific to research 
and recovery activities associated with historic resources.  15 C.F.R. § 
922.166 (2007). 
Galleon’s salvage activities are prohibited by sanctuary regulations, 
therefore Galleon was required to obtain a permit to excavate the frigate.  
The sanctuary regulations prohibit moving, removing, or possessing 
sanctuary historical resources.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(9) (2007).  
Excavation of the frigate’s cargo is therefore prohibited.  (See R. at 5.)  The 
sanctuary regulations also prohibit any injury to coral and operating a vessel 
in a way that injures seagrass.  15 C.F.R. §§ 922.163(a)(2) & (5) (2007).  
The mailbox and drilling methods of excavation are therefore prohibited.  
(See R. at 5.)  Finally, the regulations prohibit altering the seabed, including 
drilling and prop dredging.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(3) (2007).  Again, this 
prohibits the mailbox and drilling methods of excavation.  (See R. at 5.)  
This Court should therefore affirm the District Court’s ruling that a 
research/recovery permit was necessary for excavation of the sunken frigate 
because the sanctuary regulations prohibit several of Galleon’s salvage 
activities. 
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B.  A research/recovery permit is necessary for any portion of the 
sunken frigate because NOAA has authority to protect federal 
property from harm under the Property Clause 
This Court should find that a research/recovery permit is necessary for 
excavation of the frigate and its cargo, regardless of whether the individual 
pieces of the wreck are found in or out of the sanctuary.  The District Court 
found that NOAA did not have jurisdiction over the wreck outside of the 
GCNMS because it imposed too great of a burden on Galleon.  (R. at 12-
13.)  The District Court erred by failing to consider the harm to the 
historical and archaeological value of the shipwreck.  Partial excavation of 
the frigate would harm it as a sanctuary resource, and therefore NOAA has 
jurisdiction to extend its permitting power outside of GCNMS under the 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
NOAA has jurisdiction over the portions of the sunken frigate outside 
of the GCNMS because the Property Clause grants Congress broad power 
to regulate in order to protect federal property and navigable waters.  
Lindsey, 595 F.2d at 6.  The Constitution grants Congress the power to 
“make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other 
Property belonging to the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  
The Supreme Court held that under the Property Clause, federal power is 
broad enough “to reach beyond the territorial limits of its property.”  Kleppe 
v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538 (1976).  This grant of power extends to 
conduct on or off public land.  Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 
(8th Cir. 1981).  The issue is not where the activity occurs, rather if there is 
a nexus between the regulation and protection of federal property.  United 
States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1926); Grand Lake Estates 
Homeowners Ass’n v. Veneman, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167-68 (D. Colo. 
2004). 
In Grand Lake Estates, the court held that the U.S. Forest Service 
could require special use permits for a marina and boat dock built on private 
land connected to a reservoir located within the Arapahaoe National 
Recreation Area.  Id. at 1167-68, 1169.  The court found that the Forest 
Service had the regulatory authority under the Property Clause to require 
the permit because the Forest Service is authorized by Congress to protect 
National Forest System lands.  Id. at 1166.  In addition, the court found that 
there was a connection between the offsite activity the Forest Service 
sought to permit and harm to federal property.  Id. at 1168.  The Forest 
Service found that the marina and docks would endanger the water quality 
of the reservoir on federal property.  Id.  The special use permits therefore 
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directly addressed the needs of the reservoir and were reasonably related to 
protecting the federal land.  Id. at 1167-68. 
Here, Congress delegated the authority of the Property Clause to 
NOAA.  The NMSA grants NOAA the statutory authority to protect the 
GCNMS and its sanctuary resources.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445(a).  
Specifically, the GCNMS was established to protect shipwrecks and other 
sanctuary resources.  R. at 6; 16 U.S.C. § 1436(1).  NOAA therefore has the 
statutory and regulatory authority to extend the research/recovery permit to 
the portions of the sunken frigate and its cargo outside of the GCNMS.  See 
Grand Lake Estates, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-68. 
In addition, there is a sufficient nexus between the regulation and the 
protection of federal resources to extend the research/recovery permit to the 
entire sunken frigate.  The GCNMS regulations protect the historical, 
cultural and archaeological value of the site of the sunken frigate.  15 
C.F.R. § 922.166.  The value of the wreck cannot be maintained, however, 
if the site as a whole is not protected.  Contextual information received 
from the items found in a shipwreck allows archaeologists to make 
inferences about the past.  United States v. Fisher, 977 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 
(S.D. Fla. 1997).  Partial excavation of the sunken frigate will damage 
contextual information, which is the relationship between a site and the 
artifacts.  Id.  It will therefore lead to the loss of important information 
about the wreck and will therefore harm the sanctuary resource.  This Court 
should therefore reverse the District Court’s decision and extend the 
protection of the research/recovery permit to the entire sunken frigate. 
C. This Court should find that NOAA interpreted the NMSA 
permissibly and denied Galleon’s application for a permit 
based on the relevant factors 
The NMSA is ambiguous as to which factors NOAA should consider 
when judging any kind of special use permit, including research/recovery 
permits.  Therefore, NOAA therefore interpreted the NMSA to require that 
before NOAA grants a research/recovery permit for the excavation of a 
sunken ship, the applicant must show it has title to the ship or a right to 
salvage.  NOAA denied Galleon’s application for a permit because Galleon 
was unable to obtain Spain’s approval for this salvage.  It was reasonable 
for NOAA to require Spain’s permission because all of the information 
Galleon provided to NOAA indicated the ship was subject to sovereign 
immunity.  This Court should therefore uphold the District Court’s ruling 
that NOAA acted permissibly in denying Galleon a research/recovery 
permit. 
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1. NOAA acted within its statutory authority in interpreting 
ambiguities in the NMSA to require salvors to obtain the 
permission of foreign sovereigns before excavation of 
shipwrecks 
The decision to deny Galleon’s application for a research/recovery 
permit was proper because NOAA reasonably interpreted its own authority 
to require denial of a permit to salvage ships subject to sovereign immunity.  
Judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is 
two-pronged.  Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  The 
reviewing court first asks if Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
issue at hand.  Id.  If Congress’s intent is clear, then the court and the 
agency are both required to follow that intent.  Id.  If Congress has not 
directly addressed the issue, then the inquiry is whether the agencies’ 
interpretation of the statute is permissible.  Id.  The court will give the 
agency’s regulations controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.  Id. at 844. 
Here, the NMSA is ambiguous on what factors NOAA should consider 
in judging an application for a research/recovery permit.  The statute 
authorizing the Secretary to issue “special use permits” requires activities 
under the permit to be conducted in a manner that is consistent with 
sanctuary purposes and does not harm sanctuary resources.  16 U.S.C. § 
1441(c) (2006).  The Secretary may issue permits that authorize conduct 
otherwise prohibited within the sanctuary in order to regulate that conduct 
or to promote public use and education.  16 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).  The 
NMSA is ambiguous regarding what kind of conduct is prohibited within 
sanctuaries or what constitutes a sanctuary resource.  16 U.S.C. § 1434 
(2006).  Congress left these determinations, which inform special use 
permits, to be made on a case by case basis by NOAA.  Id.  Furthermore, 
each designated sanctuary must have a management plan to inform special 
use permit determinations.  16 U.S.C. § 1434(e) (2006).  In order to 
administer congressionally authorized programs, agencies must necessarily 
formulate policy and rules to fill any gaps left by Congress.  Morton v. Ruiz, 
415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).  This is the kind of delegation of authority 
contemplated in Chevron.  467 U.S. at 843. 
This Court should find NOAA’s interpretation of its permitting 
authority to be permissible because it was a reasonable construction of a 
congressional mandate and it was permissible under the statute.  In 
determining whether an agency’s construction of a statute is permissible, 
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the court asks if it was reasonable.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.  This is a 
deferential standard, even when courts disagree with the agency 
interpretation.  Fed. Election Comm’n, 454 U.S. at 37.  The agency’s 
construction need not be the best one available, but will be judged on 
whether its reasoning was thorough, valid, and consistent.  Id. at 37-39.  In 
Federal Election, the Court held that the Federal Election Commission 
provided enough of a reasoned and consistent explanation for its prohibition 
against some kinds of election finance.  Id. at 36.  The Court found that the 
FEC had published consistent reports and sufficiently linked its 
interpretation to the purposes of its governing act.  Id. at 36-38. 
NOAA’s regulations regarding permits in the GCNMS are reasonable 
because they are consistent and reflect the purposes of the NMSA.  The 
overarching congressional intent of the NMSA is to protect marine 
resources of special historical, cultural, or environmental value.  16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1431(a)(2), 1431(b)(1), 1432(8), 1433(a)(2)(A) (2006).  The NMSA also 
requires that regulations promulgated under the Act accord with treaties, 
conventions, agreements to which the United States is a party, and generally 
recognized principles of international law.  16 U.S.C. § 1435(a) (2006).  
The purpose of the GCNMS in particular is to protect natural and cultural 
resources such as shipwrecks.  (R. at 5.)  The sanctuary is governed by the 
regulations and management plan for the FKNMS. 
NOAA’s decision to deny permits where sovereign immunity applies 
reflects these goals.  The sanctuary regulations prohibit moving, removing, 
or possessing sanctuary historical resources.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(9) 
(2007).  This is consistent with the NMSA’s concern for the protection of 
these historical resources.  16 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(2) (2006).  As discussed 
above, the Secretary may issue special use permits that allow activities 
otherwise prohibited.  16 U.S.C. § 1441.  Specifically, the Secretary may 
issue a Research/Recovery of Sanctuary Historic Resources permit.  15 
C.F.R. § 922.166(c).  Research and recovery permits must conform with the 
Sunken Cultural Resources (SCR) Agreement.  15 C.F.R. § 922.166(c)(2) 
(ii) (2006).  The SCR Agreement bars access to a sunken vessel subject to 
sovereign immunity without the permission of the foreign sovereign.  
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM-
MATIC AGREEMENT AMONG THE NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMINISTRATION, THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 
AND THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOR HISTORICAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
IN THE FLORIDA KEYS NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY (1998). 
The decision to require permission of a sovereign is based on 
thorough, valid, and consistent reasoning.  First, the NMSA seeks to honor 
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international law.  The laws of sovereign immunity, salvage and find would 
fall under this category.  If NOAA did not seek to ensure a salvager has title 
or permission to salvage a sunken vessel or its cargo, it would fail to 
consistently follow the NMSA.  Second, one of the purposes of the 
GCNMS is the protection of shipwrecks.  Granting permits for research / 
recovery of sunken cargo without clearing legal property issues would leave 
this sanctuary resource more vulnerable to harm.  NOAA’s interpretation of 
its permitting authority is therefore reasonable and deserves full discretion 
from this Court. 
2. NOAA considered the relevant factors in denying Galleon’s 
research/recovery permit and its decision should therefore 
receive full deference 
NOAA properly applied the facts in the present case to the relevant 
factors in the NMSA in denying Galleon a research/recovery permit.  
Judicial review of agency action does not end after the court finds the 
agency permissibly interpreted its statutory authority.  5 U.S.C. § 706 
(2)(A).  The reviewing court must also find that the application of facts to 
law was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.”  Id.  The test is whether the agency considered the 
relevant factors and avoided a clear error of judgment.  Overton Park, 401 
U.S. at 416.  While the reviewing court must make a searching and careful 
inquiry into the facts, this is ultimately a narrow standard of review.  The 
court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  Id. 
Before beginning its subsequent salvage activities, Galleon applied to 
NOAA for a research and recovery permit for activity within the GCNMS.  
Based on the information provided by Galleon, NOAA determined that the 
vessel Galleon had discovered was a Spanish frigate.  (R. at 12.)  This 
information included the location of discovery and historical evidence.  (R. 
at 5.)  Galleon did not provide any documentation that other types of 
vessels sank near that location or that the discovered artifacts were from 
another country’s vessel.  (R. at 12.)  Therefore, all of the information in the 
record indicated that the ship was a Spanish frigate. 
NOAA’s decision to deny the permit is permissible under the standard 
set by the Court in Overton Park.  Based on the fact that Galleon failed to 
produce any information tending to show that the sunken frigate is not 
subject to sovereign immunity, NOAA acted reasonably in denying the 
permit.  Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.  The decision is based on the 
relevant factors because NOAA reasonably interpreted the NMSA to 
require permission of a foreign sovereign in order to salvage a vessel 
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subject to sovereign immunity.  Id.  An agency must base its decision on the 
facts before it, and in this case all of the facts establish that Galleon needed 
Spain’s permission to salvage the sunken vessel.  This Court should affirm 
the District Court’s ruling that NOAA acted reasonably in denying Galleon 
the research/recovery permit. 
IV.  THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE ACTED PROPERLY IN 
DENYING GALLEON’S APPLICATION FOR AN INCIDEN-
TAL TAKE PERMIT BECAUSE THE PROPOSED SALVAGE 
ACTIVITY WOULD CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO 
ENDANGERED DEEP SEA CORAL 
This Court should find that the Secretary acted permissibly in denying 
the incidental take permit because the decision was reasonable and based on 
the relevant factors.  Section 706 of the APA governs review of the 
Secretary’s actions because the ESA contains no internal standard of 
review.  5 U.S.C. § 706; Vill. of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609 (9th 
Cir.1984).  Therefore, the standard of review is deferential to the point that 
the court must presume the agency action is valid.  Sierra Club v. Marsh, 
976 F.2d 763, 769 (1st Cir. Me. 1992).  The court will only overrule an 
agency decision that is too unreasonable in the context of the record for the 
law to allow it to stand.  Id. 
The ESA has two main functions: (1) it authorizes the identification of 
species that are threatened or endangered and, (2) it prohibits certain actions 
towards these species, including take of wildlife.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 
1533, 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006).  “Take” includes harm that actually kills or 
injures a species.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater 
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-700 (1995); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United 
States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 873-874 (D. Ariz. 2003) (degradation of habit 
is a take if it actually harms or injures a species).  Limited exceptions are 
allowed to the prohibition against take.  See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1539 
(2006).  For example, the Secretary may issue an incidental take permit to a 
private party allowing limited take of a species if such taking is incidental 
to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.  
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
This Court should give full deference to denial of the permit because 
the Secretary may deny an incidental take permit based on the harm to the 
species.  First, the Secretary may deny the permit if she finds that the take is 
not incidental.  50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(A) (2007).  Second, the Secretary 
may deny the permit if she finds that the applicant will not minimize and 
mitigate the impacts of the harm to the species.  50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(B) 
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(2007).  Third, the Secretary may deny the permit if she finds the harm to 
the species will reduce its likelihood to survive and recover in the wild.  50 
C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(D) (2007). 
The decision to deny Galleon’s permit request was based on the 
relevant factors, specifically the harm to the deep sea coral.  See Overton 
Park, 401 U.S. at 416.  Galleon’s salvage technique involved drilling 
through the endangered species to access the sunken frigate.  (R. at 6.)  The 
drilling activity caused injury by cutting through the endangered deep sea 
coral.  Id.  Direct injury to an endangered species and degradation of its 
habitat that causes injury are both considered takes.  San Carlos Apache, 
272 F. Supp. 2d at 873-874. 
The Secretary’s decision to deny Galleon an incidental take permit was 
also reasonable with regard to the purpose of the ESA.  Congress’s intent in 
enacting the ESA was to “halt and reverse the trend toward species 
extinction, whatever the cost.”  Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 175, 184 & 
n. 29.  The balance to be struck between competing interests is in favor of 
giving endangered species the highest priority.  Id. at 194.  The Court in 
Tennessee Valley described Congress’s approach to be an adoption of a 
policy of “institutionalized caution” towards endangered species.  Id.  The 
Secretary’s decision not to issue a permit that by definition allows harm to 
endangered species reflects the kind of caution the Court recognized as 
Congress’s intent in passing the ESA. 
Finally, this Court should defer to the Secretary’s decision even though 
the District Court partially erred in its reasoning in coming to the same 
conclusion.  The District Court found that the injury to the seagrass was a 
permissible reason for upholding the Secretary’s decision.  (R. at 13.)  This 
reasoning was incorrect on two fronts.  First, the Johnson seagrass is not 
listed as endangered.  Threatened Status for Johnson’s Seagrass, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 49035 (Oct. 14, 1998).  Second, the prohibition on take does not apply 
to threatened or endangered plant species.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (2006).  
The Secretary issues Section 10 incidental take permits as an exception to 
the take prohibition; if an activity is not actually prohibited, an exception is 
not necessary.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2006). 
Despite these deficiencies in the District Court’s opinion, though, the 
Secretary’s action should receive full deference.  The pertinent issue is 
whether the Secretary acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner contrary 
to law, not whether the District Court’s opinion was correct.  Denial of the 
permit was based on the harm to the endangered species.  The decision was 
therefore permissible and reasonable. 
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V.  GALLEON VIOLATED THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT BY 
CONSTRUCTING A DRILLING PLATFORM IN THE CONTIG-
UOUS ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT A PROPER 
PERMIT FROM THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
Galleon violated the RHA by constructing a drilling platform without 
the required permit.  Section 10 of the RHA prohibits the creation of any 
obstruction to the navigable capacity of the waters of the United States 
without the affirmative authorization of Congress.  33 U.S.C. § 403.  In 
order to prevent obstructions to navigable waterways, and to protect the 
environmental integrity of the waters of the United States, Galleon should 
be prohibited from resuming salvage activities until it obtains the proper 
permits. 
Congress delegated regulatory authority to enforce section 10 of the 
RHA to the COE, which must authorize the construction of any structure in 
waters within the jurisdiction of the RHA.  33 U.S.C. § 403.  The Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) extended the regulatory authority 
of the COE to include the contiguous zone of the United States.  43 U.S.C. 
§ 1333(e) (2006); see also Nantucket Sound, 398 F. 3d at 108.  Thus, any 
structure constructed in the rivers, harbors, or the contiguous zone of the 
United States must first obtain a permit from the COE.  Id.  Galleon’s 
drilling platform is no exception. 
In Nantucket Sound, the First Circuit affirmed a broad interpretation of 
COE’s authority to regulate any structure on the outer continental shelf.  In 
that case, environmental organizations challenged the authority of the COE 
to approve the construction of a data tower off the coast of Massachusetts.  
Nantucket Sound, 398 F.3d at 108.  The environmental organizations argued 
that the RHA only applied to structures constructed for the purpose of 
mineral extraction.  Id.  The court, in finding for the COE, held that 
congress clearly intended the COE to have broad regulatory authority over 
all types of structures on the outer continental shelf, regardless of the 
purpose or the type of the structure.  Id. at 110.  The Nantucket Sound court 
relied upon a section of the statute which states that the RHA: 
prohibits the unauthorized obstruction or alteration of any navigable water 
of the United States.  The construction of any structure in or over any 
navigable water of the United States . . . is unlawful unless the work has 
been recommended by the chief of Engineers and authorized by the 
Secretary of the Army.  The instrument of authorization is designated a 
permit. 
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Id.; see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(b) (2007).  The court found that this 
regulation is consistent with the clear intent of Congress in enacting the 
RHA and the OCSLA.”  Nantucket Sound, 398 F.3d at 108. 
In the present case, Galleon discovered valuable items on the sea floor 
within the contiguous zone of the United States.  R. at 8.  Galleon proc-
eeded to construct a drilling platform for the purpose of drilling through 
deep-sea coral.  R. at 6.  Galleon did not obtain a permit from the COE prior 
to constructing the platform.  As the COE must authorize all types of 
structures on the outer continental shelf, Galleon was required to obtain a 
permit from the COE before constructing a drilling platform.  33 C.F.R. § 
320.2(b) (2007). 
RHA Section 406 calls for an injunction to issue ordering the removal 
of any structures erected in violation of the RHA.  33 U.S.C. § 406 (2006).  
In this case such an injunction is warranted.  This court should affirm the 
District Court’s holding that Galleon violated the RHA when it constructed 
a drilling platform without a permit. 
VI. GALLEON VIOLATED THE CWA BY DISCHARGING A 
POLLUTANT INTO THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
WITHOUT THE PROPER PERMIT 
Galleon’s salvage method resulted in the discharge of a pollutant into 
the waters of the United States.  Under the CWA a permit is required prior 
to discharging pollutants from a point source.  Thus the District Court was 
correct in holding that Galleon violated the CWA during its salvage 
operations. 
The CWA states that the “discharge of any pollutant by any person 
shall be unlawful.”  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).  Section 402, subdivision 
(a), of the CWA established NPDES as a broad exception to the prohibition 
in section 301.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006).  An NPDES permit is required 
before the discharge of any pollutant into the waters of the United States.  
Id.  As the District Court held, Galleon’s activities amounted to the 
discharge of a pollutant into the waters of the United States without an 
NPDES permit. 
In accordance with congressional intent, the EPA interprets “discharge 
of a pollutant” broadly.  40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2007).  Discharge of a pollutant 
includes “any addition of any ‘pollutant’ or combination of pollutants to the 
‘waters of the United States’ from any ‘point source.’” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a) 
(2007).  The definition of “pollutant” includes dredge spoil, heat, rock, and 
sand, inter alia, all of which are relevant in the present case.  33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14) (2006).  The definition of “point source” is “any discernible, 
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confined and discrete conveyance” and specifically includes “any pipe.”  33 
U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006). 
The mailbox technique employed by Galleon consists of attaching 
large pipes to the rear of a vessel to deflect the vessel’s propeller wash 
downward.  R. at 6.  The force of the prop wash can clear the floor of 
sediments and plants within seconds.  Id.  In another case involving treasure 
salvors, the court described the mailbox technique and the resulting 
destruction to a wide area of Johnson seagrass.  Fisher, 977 F. Supp. at, 
1196.  The court described “mailboxes” as “large angular pipes” that fit 
over the propellers of a vessel, then turn straight down to deflect the thrust 
of the propellers.  Id.  The court stated, “mailboxes are powerful devices 
that can displace five feet of hard-packed mud in thirty-five feet of water.  
They also can excavate up to twenty-five feet of sand from the ocean 
bottom.  They can make a hole in the sand thirty feet across and three to 
four feet deep in 15 seconds.” Id. 
While the CWA was not at issue in Fisher, the description of the 
mailbox technique is instructive in determining that there was a discharge 
of a pollutant from a point source in the present case.  Section 301 of the 
CWA requires the discharge to have come from a point source.  Galleon’s 
discharge came from a pipe that was attached to a vessel.  As previously 
stated, a “pipe” is explicitly included in the CWA definition of “point 
source.”  33 U.S.C § 1362(12).  Therefore, when Galleon employed the 
mailbox technique it was discharging from a point source. 
To find a violation of the CWA, we must also establish that Galleon 
discharged a pollutant from the point source.  As the court in Fisher 
described, the mailbox technique can result in the displacement of dredge 
spoil, rock, and sand from the sea floor.  977 F. Supp. at 1196.  Dredge 
spoil, rock and sand are all explicitly included in the CWA definition of 
pollutant.  While “displacement” of a pollutant is technically not the same 
thing as “discharge”, displacement has been found to satisfy the CWA’s 
definition of discharge.  Several courts have concluded that while the 
definition of “discharge” includes the “addition” of a pollutant, an 
“addition” “may reasonably be understood to include ‘redeposit.’”  
Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 923; see also United States v. M.C.C of Fla., 772 
F.2d 1501 (5th Cir. 1985) (overrules on other grounds by Backlund v. Bd. 
of  Comm’rs, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987)).  This definition of “discharge” was 
eventually affirmed.  M.C.C. of Fla., 848 F.2d at 1133.  In Avoyelles, the 
Fifth Circuit held that “redeposit” satisfies the definition of “discharge” and 
that “this reading of the definition is consistent with both the purposes and 
the legislative history of the statute.”  715 F.2d at 923. 
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Galleon may argue that their salvage activities occurred beyond the 
reach of the CWA, however in this case, the CWA applies to the contiguous 
zone of the U.S.  The term navigable waters includes “waters of the United 
States including the territorial seas.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).  The term 
“territorial seas” of the United States extends only three miles from low 
water line of the coast.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2006).  However, the CWA 
also applies to “discharges from sources ‘other than a vessel or other 
floating craft’ in the ‘contiguous zone’ and the high seas.”  Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth.  v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 n.18 
(1981).  As the mailbox technique results in the displacement of pollutants 
from a pipe, this is not a discharge from a vessel.  Rather it is a discharge 
from a pipe displacing pollutants that do not come from a vessel.  
Therefore, an NPDES permit is required for use of the mailbox technique 
within the contiguous zone of the United States.  As Galleon’s activities 
took place within the contiguous zone, their failure to obtain an NPDES 
permit constituted a violation of the CWA. 
The objective of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity” of waters of the United States.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251 (2006). The mailbox technique has the destructive potential to 
displace pollutants and compromise the physical and biological integrity of 
U.S. waters.  Furthermore, discharging a pollutant without the proper 
NPDES permit frustrates the intent of Congress to achieve the broad and 
ambitious objective of the CWA.  Galleon, by employing the mailbox 
technique, has violated the CWA prohibition against discharge of a 
pollutant from a point source without a permit.  This Court should find that 
an NPDES permit is required and enjoin Galleon from further use of the 
mailbox technique without a permit. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should find that the SMCA applies, thus the laws of find 
and salvage do not apply.  This shipwreck is also subject to sovereign 
immunity therefore Galleon must obtain consent from Spain before 
conducting Salvage activities.  NOAA has regulatory authority over the 
entire shipwreck and properly denied Galleon’s request for a 
research/recovery permit.  The Incidental Take Permit was also properly 
denied in this case.  Lastly, Galleon violated both the RHA and the CWA 
and should be enjoined from continuing salvage operations without the 
proper permits.   
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